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Abstract
Critics object that the Everett view cannot make sense of quantum prob-
abilities, in one or both of two ways: either it cannot make sense of prob-
ability at all, or it cannot explain why probability should be governed by
the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections by
appealing to an Everettian version of Savage’s rational decision theory.
Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of classical decision under un-
certainty makes sense in an Everett world; but also that under reasonable
assumptions, the betting odds of a rational Everettian agent should be
constrained by the Born rule. Deutsch’s proposal has been defended and
developed by David Wallace, and in a different form by Hilary Greaves.
In this paper I offer some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace-Greaves ar-
gument, focussing in particular on the supposed analogy with classical
decision under uncertainty.
1 Fabulous at fifty?
Our forties are often a fortunate decade. Understanding ourselves better, re-
solving old problems, we celebrate our fiftieth year with new confidence, a new
sense of purpose. So, too, for the Everett interpretation, at least according to
one reading of its recent history. Its fifth decade has resolved a difficulty that
has plagued it since youth, indeed since infancy, the so-called problem of prob-
ability. Critics have long maintained that the Everett view cannot provide an
adequate account of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it
cannot make sense of probability at all, in a world in which ‘all possibilities are
actualised’; or, at best, it cannot explain why probability should be governed
by the Born rule.
∗A slightly shorter version of this paper is to appear in a volume edited by Jonathan
Barrett, Adrian Kent, David Wallace and Simon Saunders, containing papers presented at
the Everett@50 conference in Oxford in July, 2007, and the Many Worlds@50 meeting at the
Perimeter Institute in September, 2007. See Price (2007) for the original talk on which this
paper is based.
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According to the optimistic view just mentioned, these problems have been
sorted out, in the past decade, by an approach due to David Deutsch (1999).
Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of decision under uncertainty (of the
kind traditionally associated with probability) makes sense in an Everett world;
but also that under reasonable assumptions, the betting odds of a rational
Everettian agent should be constrained by the Born rule. In one important
respect, Deutsch argues, probability is actually in better shape in the Everettian
context than in the classical ‘one-branch’ case. If so, the Everett view turns fifty
in fine form indeed.
Deutsch’s argument has been reformulated and clarified by David Wallace
(2002, 2003, 2006, 2007). Wallace stresses the argument’s reliance on the dis-
tinguishing symmetry of the Everett view, viz., that all possible outcomes of a
quantum measurement are treated as equally real. The argument thus makes a
virtue of what is usually seen as the main obstacle to making sense of probabil-
ity in this context. Further important contributions have been made by several
other writers, such as Simon Saunders (1998, 2005) and Hilary Greaves (2004,
2007a, 2007b). The result is a fascinating collection of papers, of great interest
to researchers in philosophy of probability, as well as the foundations of QM.
But does it work? In this paper, presenting the pessimistic face of turning
fifty, I want to argue that it does not. I’ll argue in particular that the distin-
guishing symmetry of the Everett view (the fact that it treats all outcomes of a
quantum measurement as equally real) is the downfall rather than the saviour
of the Deutsch-Wallace (DW) argument (or the Oxford approach, as I’ll some-
times call it). For Everett’s new ontology provides something new for agents to
have preferences about; and this, as we’ll see, makes it inevitable that rational
Everettian agents need not be Deutschian agents. (In other words, rationality
does not require that their decision behaviour be modelled by an analogue of
classical decision under uncertainty, with the Born weights playing the role of
subjective probability.) And I’ll argue that this is no mere abstract possibil-
ity. Once the loophole is in view, it is easy to see why we might prefer not to
be Deutschian agents, at least in some respects, if we believed we lived in an
Everett world.
Little in this paper is new. As I’ll note, the main point is made by Greaves
herself (though I think she underestimates its significance). But the package
has not previously been assembled in this form, so far as I know.
2 A missing link?
It is often suggested that the problem of probability in the Everett interpretation
is analogous to, and perhaps no worse than, a problem long-recognised in the
classical case. An early and forceful version of this claim is that of David
Papineau (1996). Papineau considers what he terms the Decision-Theoretical
Link:
The Decision-Theoretical Link. We base rational choices on our
knowledge of objective probabilities. In any chancy situation, a
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rational agent will consider the difference that alternative actions
would make to the objective probabilities of desired results, and
then opt for that action which maximizes objective expected utility.
(1996, 238)
‘Perhaps surprisingly,’ Papineau continues, ‘conventional thought provides no
agreed further justification [for this principle]’:
Note in this connection that what agents want from their choices
are desired results, rather than results which are objectively probable
(a choice that makes the results objectively probable, but unluckily
doesn’t produce them, doesn’t give you what you want). This means
that there is room to ask: why are rational agents well advised to
choose actions that make their desired results objectively probable?
However, there is no good answer to this question . . . . Indeed many
philosophers in this area now simply take it to be a primitive fact
that you ought to weight future possibilities according to known
objective probabilities in making rational decisions. . . . It is not
just that philosophers can’t agree on the right justification; many
have concluded that there simply isn’t one. (1996, 238)
Applying this to the many worlds case, Papineau suggests that the Ev-
erettian is therefore entitled simply to assume that rational decision in a branch-
ing universe is constrained by certain physical magnitudes postulated by QM:
[T]he many minds view should simply stipulate that the quantum
mechanical coefficients . . . provide a decision-theoretic basis for ra-
tional decisions. As to a justification for these stipulations, the many
minds theory can simply retort that it provides as good a justi-
fication as conventional thought does for treating its probabilities
similarly—namely, no good justification at all. (1996, 238–239)
Supporters of the DW approach claim that if their argument succeeds, we
actually get more than this: we get a proof that rational decision in an Everett
world is properly constrained by the Born rule. But if the proof doesn’t quite
go through, then no matter – we are still no worse off than in the classical case.
In my view, this comparison both exaggerates the difficulty in the classical
case, and misrepresents and hence underestimates the difficulty in the Everettian
case. I want to argue that so long as we keep in mind – as emphasised by the
pragmatist tradition in philosophy of probability1 – that probability properly
begins with decision under uncertainty, there isn’t any pressing mystery about
Papineau’s Decision-Theoretic Link. (There may be a problem for some views
of probability, but those views are far from compulsory – and the problem
itself counts against them, in so far as it is a problem.) On the other side,
the crucial issue for the Everettians is in a sense prior to probability: it is
1A.k.a. the subjectivist tradition, though I think there are good reasons to prefer the former
term.
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the problem whether decision under uncertainty – or some suitable analogue –
makes any sense in the many worlds case. This problem is prior, in particular,
to the question as to whether we might take it to be a brute fact that rational
Everettian decision is constrained by the Born rule; for until it is clear that there
is something coherent to constrain in this way, such an assumption is premature,
if not question-begging. The true problem in this vicinity for the Everett view
– somewhat misleadingly labelled as the problem of probability, and with no
analogue in the classical case – is the problem about uncertainty.
To give a sense of the pragmatist viewpoint, imagine creatures who make
maps of their surroundings, marking the positions of various features of practical
significance: blue dots and lines where they find the liquids they drink and wash
in, for example, and green shopping baskets where they find things to eat.
Is there any mystery, or primitive assumption at work, in the fact that the
mapmakers use these maps as a guide to where they can drink, wash and eat?
No, for that’s precisely what the maps are for. (To understand the map is to
understand that this is how it is used, as a Wittgensteinian might say.) The
mapmakers might find other interesting questions in the vicinity, of course. Why
are blue lines correlated with contour lines in such a distinctive way? Is there
is any unified physical account, either of the stuff they drink and wash in, or
of the stuff they eat? And perhaps most interestingly, what is it about the
mapmakers and their environment that explains why this mapmaking practice
is both possible and useful, to the extent that it is? But these are not the
practical puzzle about why someone who adopts the map should use it to guide
her drink-seeking and food-seeking behaviour: to adopt the map is to take it as
a practical guide.
A pragmatist regards probabilistic models in this same practical spirit. They
are maps to guide us in making decisions under uncertainty, in particular do-
mains. The previous map said, ‘Go here if you need a wash or a drink, there for
something to eat.’ This map says, ‘Use this number if you need a credence – i.e.,
if you have to make a decision with imperfect knowledge about something that
matters.’ If a probability map just is a practical guide to decision under uncer-
tainty, it isn’t a mystery why it should be used for exactly that purpose. There’s
no primitive assumption, and no decision-theoretic ‘Missing Link’. Again, there
might be other interesting questions in the vicinity – e.g., about whether, or
why, decision-theoretic ‘blue lines’ are correlated with something else on our
maps – but these are not the practical puzzle about why probability properly
guides action.2
2Would it matter is there wasn’t any unified story about ‘something else’ that correlated
with decision theoretic probability – if ‘probability’ turned out to be more like ‘food’ (where
there isn’t any interesting natural kind, apparently), than like ‘liquid for washing and drinking’
(where there is a natural kind, at least to a first approximation)? If so, why? Obviously
there is (much) more to be said on this matter, but I hope the food example goes some
way to undermining the rather simplistic conception of the options that tends to characterise
objections to the pragmatist viewpoint. Wallace, for example, says, ‘Whilst it is coherent to
advocate the abandonment of objective probabilities, it seems implausible: it commits one
to believing, for instance, that the predicted decay rate of radioisotopes is purely a matter
of belief.’ (2002, 15, my emphasis) Would abandonment of the view that ‘food’ picks out a
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The pragmatist thus applauds the Oxford approach for beginning with the
question of rational decision, but asks it to allow that classical probability does
the same. With that concession in place, the issues line up as they should.
There’s no essential primitive assumption in the classical case, to which Ev-
erettians can appeal in the spirit of ‘we do no worse than that’. And the crucial
question, the crux of the so-called problem of probability, is whether the Everett
picture allows any analogue of decision-theoretic uncertainty – any analogue of
credence, in effect.3
3 Rational choice from Savage to Deutsch
In a recent survey article, Hilary Greaves provides a concise summary of the
classical model of rational decision theory due to Savage, and of its modification
by Deutsch in the Everettian case. Here I follow and appropriate Greaves’
exposition, compressing further where possible:
Decision theory is a theory designed for the analysis of rational
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. One considers an
agent who is uncertain what the state of the world is: for example,
she is uncertain whether or not it will rain later today. The agent
faces a choice of acts: for example, she is going for a walk, and
she has to decide whether or not to take an umbrella. She knows,
for each possible state of the world and each possible act, what will
be the consequence if the state in question obtains and the act in
question is performed: for example, she knows that, if she elects not
to take the umbrella and it rains, she will get wet. The agent is
therefore able to describe each of her candidate acts as a function
from the set of possible States to the set of Consequences. (Greaves
2007b, 113)
As Greaves explains, Savage then shows that given certain plausible ratio-
nality constraints, one may prove a ‘representation theorem’:
[F]or any agent whose preferences over acts satisfy the given ratio-
nality constraints, there exists a unique probability measure p on the
set of States, and a utility function U on the set of Consequences
(unique up to positive linear transformation), such that, for any two
acts A,B, the agent prefers A to B iff the expected utility of A is
greater than that of B. Here, the expected utility of an act A is
defined by:
EU(A) :=
∑
s∈S
p(s) · U(A(s)).
natural kind commit us to believing that it is purely a matter of taste? Surely there’s room
for some subtlety here – room for a bit of natural science, in effect, that begins by asking
why the concepts concerned (‘food’ or ‘probability’) should be useful for creatures in our
circumstances, to the extent that they are useful (and anticipates an answer that refers both
to aspects of the environment and to aspects of ourselves)?
3To the satisfaction of what need could Everettian probability be our guide, as it were?
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Deutsch modifies this classical apparatus by replacing the set of States with
the set of branches that will result from a specified quantum measurement,
and the set of Consequences with, as Greaves puts it ‘things that happen to
individual copies of the agent, on particular branches.’ An Act is still a function
from States to Consequences, but in this new sense of Consequence: in other
words, it is an assignment of Consequences or rewards to branches defined by
measurement outcomes. Then, by ‘imposing a set of rationality constraints on
agents’ preferences among such quantum games’,
Deutsch is able to prove a representation theorem that is anal-
ogous in many respects to Savage’s: the preferences of a ratio-
nal agent are representable by a probability measure over the set
of States (branches) for every possible chance setup, and a util-
ity function on the set of Consequences (rewards-on-branches), such
that, for any two Everettian acts A,B, the agent prefers A to B
iff EU(A)>EU(B). (Expected utility is defined via the same formal
expression as above.) (2007b, 115)
3.1 Wallace’s version of Deutsch’s approach
How does an analogue of uncertainty enter the picture? Since much hangs on
this issue, I’ll reproduce a clear account of the relevant move fromWallace (2007,
316–317), in a formulation of the axioms in which uncertainty is ‘on the surface’.
[D]efine a likelihood ordering as some two-place relation holding be-
tween ordered pairs 〈E,M〉, where M is a quantum measurement
and E is an event in EM (that is, E is a subset of the possible
outcomes of the measurement). We write the relation as :
E|M  F |N
is then to be read as “It’s at least as likely that some outcome in E
will obtain (given that measurement M is carried out) as it is that
some outcome in F will obtain (given that measurement N is carried
out)”. We define ≃ . . . as follows: E|M ≃ F |N if E|M  F |N and
F |N  E|M . . . .
We will say that such an ordering is represented by a function
Pr from pairs 〈E,M〉 to the reals if
1. Pr(∅|M) = 0, and Pr(SM |M) = 1, for each M .
2. If E and F are disjoint then Pr(E ∪ F |M) = Pr(E|M) +
Pr(F |M).
3. Pr(E|M) ≥ Pr(F |N) iff E|M  F |N .
The ordering is uniquely represented iff there is only one such Pr.
The subjectivist program then seeks to find axioms for  so
that any agent’s preferences are uniquely represented. . . . [I]n a
quantum-mechanical context we can manage with a set of axioms
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which is both extremely weak . . . and fairly simple. To state them,
it will be convenient to define a null event : an event E is null with
respect to M (or, equivalently, E|M is null) iff E|M ≃ ∅|M . (That
is: E is certain not to happen, given M). If it is clear which M
we’re referring to, we will sometimes drop the M and refer to E as
null simpliciter.
We can then say that a likelihood ordering is minimally rational
if it satisfies the following axioms:
Transitivity  is transitive: if E|M  F |N and F |N  G|O, then
E|M  G|O.
Separation There exists some E and M such that E|M is not null.
Dominance If E ⊆ F , then F |M  E|M for any M , with F |M ≃
E|M iff E − F is null.
This is an extremely weak set of axioms for qualitative likelihood
. . . . Each, translated into words, should be immediately intuitive:
1. Transitivity: ‘If A is at least as likely than B and B is at least
as likely than C, then A is at least as likely than C.’
2. Separation: ‘There is some outcome that is not impossible.’
3. Dominance: ‘An event doesn’t get less likely just because more
outcomes are added to it; it gets more likely iff the outcomes
which are added are not themselves certain not to happen.’
3.2 Comments
Wallace is right, of course, that any reasonable notion of qualitative likelihood
should be expected to satisfy these axioms. But to characterise the target is not
yet to hit the bullseye. The axiom system provides no answer to the puzzle as to
what such a notion of subjective likelihood could amount to, in the Everettian
context, where there is no classical uncertainty. So if we assume these axioms as
the basis for a quantum version of the representation theorem, we are assuming,
rather than demonstrating, that there is some non-trivial Everettian analogue
of decision-theoretic uncertainty. (We know that there is a trivial measure of
likelihood available in the Everett world: it assigns equal and maximal likeli-
hood to all results not certain not to happen. But this measure doesn’t satisfy
Dominance, for it fails the requirement that Wallace glosses as: ‘An event . . .
gets more likely iff the outcomes which are added are not themselves certain not
to happen.’)
I’m not suggesting that Wallace is confused about these points, of course.
On the contrary, he and others have discussed at length what the required
analogue of uncertainty might be. (More on this below.) Nevertheless, I think
it is worth stressing that the availability of an appropriate notion of uncertainty
doesn’t emerge from the DW argument, but is presupposed by it. So if we
sceptics are challenged to say which of these axioms we disagree with, we have
at least the following answer: we’re sceptical about any axiom – e.g., Wallace’s
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Dominance, for one – that presupposes an analogue of uncertainty. And we’ll
remain sceptical, until our opponents convince us that they have a notion that
will do the job.
4 The quest for uncertainty
There are two main proposals as to how we might make sense of the required no-
tion of decision-theoretic uncertainty, or likelihood. The first turns on the claim
that an Everettian agent properly feels genuine though subjective uncertainty,
as to which branch she will find herself in, after a quantum measurement. The
second argues that the required analogue of uncertainty isn’t really any sort of
uncertainty at all, but rather what Greaves calls a ‘caring measure’ – a measure
of how much ‘weight’ a rational agent should give to a particular branch.
Greaves (2004) herself has offered some robust and (to me) fairly persuasive
criticisms of the subjective uncertainty approach. I want to raise an additional
difficulty for this view, not mentioned (so far as I know) in the existing liter-
ature. It, too, seems to suggest that Greaves’ approach is the right approach,
if anything is – though it also contains the seeds of an objection to her view, I
think. It turns on what I hope are some uncontroversial observations about the
role of subjects and survival in rational decision theory.
4.1 Decision theory doesn’t care about personal identity
First, rational decision theory depends on the fact that agents care about out-
comes, but not on whether these outcomes are things that the agent herself
experiences. They are things the agent has preferences about – her loci of con-
cern, as I’ll say – but her own future experiences are just one possible class of
such things.
Thus consider a case in which the relevant outcome is that a child is happy
at a specified time in the future. What is revealed by my betting preferences
is the utility – for me, now – of the child’s being happy, not the utility for the
child (now or in the future). Similarly if we replace the child by some future
person-stage of me: what’s revealed by my betting preferences now is the utility
for the present me of the future me being happy, not the utility for the future
me.
In general, then, it is entirely inessential to classical subjective decision the-
ory that its subjects have future selves, at the time of the relevant Consequences.
We can imagine a race of short-lived creatures for whom all decisions would be
like death-bed decisions are for us – we prefer that there should be some futures
rather than others, and act so as to maximise our expected utility, in the light
of uncertainty, of a future that we ourselves shall not experience. Indeed, we
can imagine a view of the metaphysics of personal identity according to which
this is inevitably our own situation: there is no genuine trans-temporal personal
identity, according to this view, and our decisions cannot but concern a future
that we ourselves will never see. In such a case, of course, there is simply no
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place for subjective uncertainty about which future we will experience. Properly
informed by our metaphysical friends, we know that we will experience none of
them. No matter – our classical decision theory takes all this in its stride. (The
relevant uncertainty is just the agent’s uncertainty as to which future is actual.)
I’ve emphasised these points to highlight a respect in which the subjective
uncertainty version of Deutschian decision theory seems inevitably less general
than its classical ancestor. It needs to take sides on some heavy-duty meta-
physical issues about personal identity, so as to rule out the view according to
which there is no such thing as genuine survival. And even with the help of
such metaphysics, it only applies, at least directly, to cases in which the agent
does survive – for it is only in these cases that the relevant notion of subjective
expectation makes sense. On my death bed, I expect nothing for tomorrow –
Everett-embarrassing Lewisean loopholes to one side, at least!4
4.2 What does survival mean, and why does it matter?
There other difficulties lurking nearby. For what does survival mean? Consider
a classical analogy. Suppose, modifying the above example, that I am making
a decision which will affect the happiness of a group of children. There is no
uncertainty involved. I have several options, each with different consequences
for the happiness of each of the children. I act so as to maximise my utility,
which (by assumption) depends on nothing other than (my beliefs about) the
resulting happiness of the children. There are many ways my utility function
might vary over the N -dimensional space representing the degree of happiness
of each of the N children, but suppose I am a simple-minded consequentialist
– then my utility just goes by the total happiness, summed over the group of
children.
Now suppose that initially I plan to make my choice in the belief that I will
not live to see the outcome, but then learn that I am going to be reincarnated
as one of the children. Does survival make any difference to my calculation? In
particular, does it provide a role for an ascription of a probability to the matter
of which child I shall be?
There are two ways it can fail to do so. One possibility is that I believe that
I will find myself in a child’s body with the same ‘global’ perspective as before –
the same concern for the welfare of the group of children as a whole. If so, then
4See Lewis 2004. The claim I make here about the generality of the subjective uncertainty
view might be challenged. Wallace himself says:
‘Subjective’ should not be taken too literally here. The subjectivity lies in the
essential role of a particular location in the quantum universe (uncertainty isn’t
visible from a God’s-eye view). But it need not be linked to first-person expec-
tations: ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ might be as uncertain as ‘I will see
spin up’. (2007, 314)
I don’t have space to pursue this point here, but it seems that for a view not linked to first-
person expectations, the subjective uncertainty approach spends an inordinate amount of time
discussing issues of personal identity over time. My point is that these issues are essentially
irrelevant to classical subjective decision theory, for which the only ‘I’ who matters is the ‘I’
at the time of decision.
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although survival means that I will live to enjoy the utility of my choice, it makes
no difference to the calculation. My reincarnated self will have the same utility
function as I do now, whichever child he turns out to be. Another possibility
is that ‘I’ will find ‘myself’ with the preferences of the child in question, in
which case ‘I’ will be happy or sad according as he is happy or sad – the fate
of the other children won’t come into it. But unless I take this now as a reason
to abandon my even-handed approach to the future welfare of the children –
more on this possibility in a moment – then again, survival makes no difference.
(After all, I knew already that there would be a child with that perspective.)
In either case, then, there’s no role for a probability in my calculation, despite
the survival. In other words, if reincarnation doesn’t break the symmetry of
my original attitude to the children then it is irrelevant; if it does break the
symmetry, but only from the moment of reincarnation, then it is not survival,
in any sense that matters here.
In the classical case there’s a third possibility: the news about reincarnation
might break the symmetry at the beginning, in the sense that I will make my
initial utility calculation in a different way altogether: I’ll base it on the future
happiness of one child, weighted by my credence that that child is the future
me.
Notice that although this last option makes sense in the classical case – we
can intelligibly suppose that the symmetry is broken in this way – it would be
absurd to suggest that rationality requires me to do it this way. Rationality
requires that I act now on the basis of what matters to me now. This might
depend on what happens to me in the future, in so far as we can make sense
of that notion, but it need not do so: rationality doesn’t impose that outlook.
And it doesn’t take my survival to break the symmetry, either. We can get the
same result by adding the supposition that only one of the group of children –
I don’t know which one – will survive to the relevant time in the future. In this
case, too, I may well need a decision theory that can cope with uncertainty. But
that need stems from the fact that the world breaks a symmetry among a class
of things that I care about, not from the fact (if it is a fact) that one of those
things is a future version of ‘me’.
Now transpose this to an Everett case, in which I am facing a choice between
gambles on a quantum measurement. I believe that there are multiple real future
branches, one (or at least one) for each possible measurement outcome. The
different gambles produce different outcomes for individuals whose welfare I care
about, in each of the branches. Does it matter whether any of those individuals
are ‘me’? As in the previous case, there are two sense in which it seems not to
matter: the first in which the future individual concerned has the same ‘global’
concerns as I have, and simply takes himself to be enjoying the net global utility
which I could already foresee with certainty; and the second in which the future
individual is no longer the me that matters, for present purposes, in that his
concerns have become more selfish than mine (he only cares about what happens
in his branch).
Is there a third sense, a symmetry-breaking sense, such that my initial de-
cision should now become a weighted sum over a range of possibilities? The
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subjective uncertainty view claims that there is – that we can make sense of the
symmetry being broken ‘subjectively’, though not objectively. (The whole point
of the Everett view is that it is not broken objectively.) My point is that even if
this were so – and even if it could conceivably be relevant to the decision maker,
who clearly doesn’t occupy any of these subjective stances, to the exclusion of
any of the others – it couldn’t be a rationality requirement that decisions be
made on that basis. If an Everettian agent’s present utilities depend on his view
of the welfare of occupants of multiple future branches, then – just as in the
case of the children – it is irrelevant which of those branches he takes himself
(subjectively!) to occupy.
One lesson of the move to the case in which only one child would survive was
that in that case, uncertainty was forced on us by the ontology – uncertainty
about which of our various loci of concern (the children) would be ‘actual’ (alive),
at the relevant time in the future.5 The shift to the Everett world takes us in
the other direction. It removes the uncertainty, by rendering equally real all of
an agent’s previous (‘classical’) loci of concern. As in the case of the children,
it couldn’t be a requirement of rationality that we put the uncertainty back in,
even if we did have a notion of subjective uncertainty that could do the job.
5 Two cheers for the caring measure
These considerations were intended to supplement the arguments that Greaves,
in particular, has offered against the subjective uncertainty approach. It is a
great advantage of Greaves’ caring measure approach that it does take seriously
the new ‘global’ perspective of an Everettian agent. Moreover, although Greaves
herself formulates the view in terms of an agent’s care for her own future de-
scendants, this seems inessential. If the approach works, then caring measures
are a rational discounting factor for any source of utility from future branches,
whether it concerns the welfare of the agent’s own descendants or not. (This
inoculates the approach from issues about personal identity, survival, and the
like – those matters are simply irrelevant, in my view, for the reasons above.)
So why only two cheers for the caring measure? Because (I claim) its vic-
tory over the subjective uncertainty view turns on a point that proves its own
Achilles’ Heel. Once the new global viewpoint of the Everettian agent is on the
table, it turns out to count against Greaves’ proposal, too, in two senses. First,
and more theoretically, it shows us how to make sense of an Everettian agent
who, although entirely rational in terms of his own utilities, fails to conform to
the Deutschian model.6 Second, and more practically, it leads us in the direc-
tion of reasons why we ourselves might reasonably choose to be such agents, if
we became convinced that we lived in an Everett world. Thus I want to make
two kinds of points:
5The other lesson was that it isn’t relevant whether the child in question is ‘me’, unless
my present preferences make it so.
6As I noted, Greaves (2004, 451–452) is well aware of this possibility.
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1. The new ontology of the Everett view introduces a new locus of possible
concern. The utilities of a rational Everettian agent might relate directly
to the global ontology of the Everett view, and only indirectly, if at all,
to ‘in-branch’ circumstances. (For such an agent uncertainty enters the
picture, if at all, only in a classical manner.) The DW argument rules out
such agents by fiat, in effect, by assuming that utilities are an ‘in-branch’
matter.
2. Even if we restrict ourselves to agents whose global preferences do show
some ‘reasonable’ regard for the welfare of their in-branch descendants, it
doesn’t follow that the global preference should be to maximise a Born-
weighted sum of in-branch utilities. This isn’t the only option, and there
are at least two kinds of reasons for thinking is should not be the preferred
option: one objects to summing, and the other to weighting.
5.1 The threat of globalisation
One of the lessons of the previous section was that ‘Where goes ontology, there
a possible preference’. Decision theory places no constraints on what agents
care about, other than that it be real.7 The new ontology of the Everett view
– the global wave function itself – thus brings in its wake the possibility of an
agent who cares about that. Hence the challenge, in its most general form: by
what right do we assume that the preferences of Everettian agents are driven
by ‘in branch’ preferences at all?
This may seem a trivial point. After all, even in the classical case we can
imagine agents whose preferences are so non-specific that uncertainty disap-
pears, from their point of view. (All I care about is that something happens
tomorrow.) This doesn’t seem to lessen the importance of the theory for less un-
interesting agents. Isn’t a similar move possible in the Everettian case? Granted,
the caring measure approach doesn’t apply non-trivially to any possible agent,
but if it applies to a large and interesting class of agents, isn’t that good enough?
Can’t we just restrict ourselves by fiat to the case of agents whose preferences
do depend on what happens in future branches?
Unfortunately for the DW argument, no such restriction seems likely to get
it off the hook at this point, unless it is so strong as to be question-begging. For
the argument’s own prescription for rational choice between quantum games –
‘Choose the option that maximises expected utility, calculated using the Born
weights’ – is itself a rule for choosing between future global wave functions. To
adopt such a rule, then, is to accept a principle for choice at this global level – at
which, obviously, there is neither uncertainty nor any analogue of uncertainty.
(The caring measure is already rolled up inside this global rule.)
But this means that if someone already has a different preference at the
global level – in particular, a different way of ranking wave functions according
7It would be interesting to explore the subtleties of this restriction in the case of modal
realities, variously construed, but that would take us a long way astray.
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to what goes in in the branches they entail (we’ll meet some examples in a mo-
ment) – then the DW argument has nothing to say to them. Rationality may
dictate choice in the light of preference, but it doesn’t dictate preference itself.
(Recall our principle: ‘Where goes ontology, there goes possible preference.’)
Pace Greaves (2004, 452), this argument has no analogue in the classical case,
because in that case there’s no ontology at the ‘global’ level – only the ‘local’
ontology, and then uncertainty about that.8 By actualising the epistemic possi-
bilia, the Everett view introduces a new locus of possible preference, and hence
leaves itself vulnerable to this challenge.
It seems to me that at a minimum, this argument establishes that the DW
argument cannot rest on a principle of rationality. It shows us how to imagine
agents whose preferences are such it would clearly be irrational for them to
follow the DW prescription, in an Everett world – given their preferences, ratio-
nality requires them to make different choices about the global wave function.9
It seems to me that the best response to this objection would be to fight back
at the level of global preferences – to try to show that a preference for anything
other than maximising a Born-weighted sum of in-branch payoffs would be (in
some sense) unreasonable. My next goal is to show that this fight will be an
uphill battle: in some respects, such anti-Deutschian global preferences look
very reasonable indeed. Reasonable folk like us might well conclude that there
are better ways to care for the welfare of future branches.
5.2 Choices about group welfare
The considerations I have in mind of are two kinds:
1. An MEU model seems in some respect just the wrong kind of model for
this kind of decision problem, which concerns the welfare of a group of
individuals (i.e., the inhabitants of multiple future branches). In the clas-
sical case, there are well-known difficulties for weighted sum approaches
8Could someone sufficiently realist about probability find a classical analogue in the possi-
bility of an agent who cared directly about the probabilities, so that probability itself provided
their (classical) analogue of additional ontology provided by the Everett view? As a prag-
matist, I’m inclined to say that there is a potential analogy here, and so much the worse for
some kinds of realism about probability. For present purposes, however, let me just emphasise
two points of disanalogy. First, the extra ontology of the Everett view is in no sense optional
– on the contrary, it is the heart of the physical theory itself. Second, what this extra on-
tology consists in, inter alia, is a whole lot more of the kind of things that ordinary people
care about anyway (as opposed, so to speak, to something that only a metaphysician could
love). The suggested analogy, by contrast, would fly in the face of the fact noted by Papineau,
in the passage we quoted above: ‘[W]hat agents want from their choices are desired results,
rather than results which are objectively probable (a choice that makes the results objectively
probable, but unluckily doesn’t produce them, doesn’t give you what you want).’
9I note in passing another reason for thinking that the DW argument might be vulnerable
in this way, viz., that the argument itself appeals to attitudes to global states at a crucial
point. The principle Wallace calls Equivalence requires as a matter of rationality that an
agent should rank two Acts equally, if they give rise to the same global state. In relying on
this principle, the argument can hardly afford to be dismissive about the idea of preferences
for global states.
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to the welfare of groups of individuals, and I want to argue that similar
considerations seem to apply in the Everett case.
2. In so far as an MEU model is appropriate, there is no adequate justifica-
tion for discounting the interests of low-weight individuals. I’ll make this
point by asking why we feel entitled to discount low-weight alternatives
in the classical case, and arguing that this justification has no analogue
in an Everettian framework (whether via a caring measure or subjective
uncertainty).
Concerning both points, it will be helpful to have a vivid example in mind, to
guide (or pump) our intuitions.
6 Legless at Bondi
Suppose I’m swimming at Bondi Beach, and a shark bites off my right leg.
Saved from the immediate threat of exsanguination, I’m offered a wonderful
new treatment. In the hospital’s new Cloning Clinic (CC), surgeons will make a
(reverse) copy of my left leg, and attach it in place of the missing limb. As with
any operation there are risks: I might lose my left leg, or die under anaesthetic.
But if these risks are small, it seems rational to consent to the procedure.
On my way to the CC, however, I learn a disturbing further fact: it is
actually a Body Cloning Clinic (BCC). The surgeons are going to reverse-copy
all of me, remove the good right leg from the clone, and attach it to me. So I
get two good legs at the expense of a legless twin. (This poor chap wakes up,
complaining, in another ward – and is handed the consent form, on which ‘he’
accepted the risk that he would find himself in this position.)
This new information seems to make a difference. I’m a lot less happy at the
thought of gaining a new leg at this cost to someone else – especially someone
so dear to me! – than I was at gaining it merely at the cost of risk to ‘myself’.
What’s more, my discomfort seems completely insensitive to considerations of
subjective uncertainty or branch weight. It isn’t lessened by the certainty – as
I told the story – that it would be ‘me’ who gets the legs; nor, apparently, by
the information that the other ward is in another branch of the wave function,
with very low weight.
Perhaps these intuitions simply need to be stared down, or massaged away.
Perhaps I would lose them, once fully acquainted with the meaning of probability
and uncertainty, or their analogues, in an Everettian context. Perhaps. But if
so, a case needs to be made out. The significance of the example is that it
suggests at least two ways in which such a case might be weak – two ways in
which, at least arguably, a reasonable decision rule in an Everett world would
not follow a Born-weighted MEU model.
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7 Branching and distributive justice
Decision in the Everett world concerns the welfare of a group of future individ-
uals – one’s future descendants, or more generally one’s ‘objects of concern’, in
all future branches. This fact is highlighted by Greaves’ approach, but clearly
true for the subjective uncertainty approach as well. (As we saw, subjective
uncertainty might make it possible to be selfish, but can’t make it rationally
obligatory. And my disquiet in the Bondi example isn’t offset by certainty that
it’s me who gets the legs.) The challenge is that rational decision in such a con-
text – a context involving group welfare – seems in some respects fundamentally
different from any weighted sum model.
As I noted, this is a familiar point in discussions of distributive justice. The
problem with a weighted-sum allocation of goods to a group is that it always
permits a large cost to one individual to be offset by small gains to others. A
principle of maximising such a sum thus conflict with plausible principles of
justice: ‘Pleasure for some should not knowingly be gained at the cost of pain
for another.’
The plausibility of some such principle is highlighted by the famous Trolley
Problem, in which we are asked whether it would be acceptable to kill one person
– e.g., in one well-known version, a fat man sitting on a bridge, who might be
pushed into the path of a runaway tram, thus killing him but saving the lives of
several passengers – in order to benefit others. To a remarkable degree, ordinary
humans seem to agree that this would not be morally acceptable.10
If we approach the choices facing Everettian agents in this frame of mind,
viewing them as problems of group welfare, then some attractive decision prin-
ciples might include the following:
1. First, do no harm: we should try to establish a baseline, below which we
don’t knowingly allow our descendants to fall (at least not simply for the
sake of modest advantage to others).
2. Second, unequal ‘good luck’ seems a lot less objectionable than unequal
‘bad luck’. An Everettian might be inclined to play lotteries, for example,
10Another version, even closer to Legless at Bondi, is Transplant:
Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ trans-
plant. The patient in Room 1 needs a heart, the patient in Room 2 needs a
liver, the patient in Room 3 needs a kidney, and so on. The person in Room 6
is in the hospital for routine tests. Luckily (for them, not for him!), his tissue is
compatible with the other five patients, and a specialist is available to transplant
his organs into the other five. This operation would save their lives, while killing
the “donor”. There is no other way to save any of the other five patients. . . .
[W]ith the right details filled in, it looks as if cutting up the “donor” will maxi-
mize utility, since five lives have more utility than one life. If so, then classical
utilitarianism implies that it would not be morally wrong for the doctor to per-
form the transplant and even that it would be morally wrong for the doctor not
to perform the transplant. Most people find this result abominable. They take
this example to show how bad it can be when utilitarians overlook individual
rights, such as the unwilling donor’s right to life. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006)
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accepting that most of his descendants will make rather trivial sacrifices,
in order to make it certain that one will hit the jackpot.
3. Third, we might trade off ‘quantity’ for ‘quality’, as in quantum Russian
roulette (Squires 1986, 72).
This isn’t intended as a definitive list – it is far from clear there could be
such a thing. It is simply intended to illustrate that agents who approach
Everettian decision problems in the spirit of Greaves’ caring measure, with the
welfare of descendants uppermost in their minds, need not see matters entirely,
or primarily, in terms of an MEU model. There are other intuitive appealing
decision principles available in such cases, of a much more qualitative nature.
An argument for the unique reasonableness of the Deutschian global preference
would need to convince us that these contrary intuitions are guilty of some deep
error.
7.1 Objections to the distributive justice analogy
7.1.1 What about the axioms of rationality?
One objection appeals to the plausibility of the decision-theoretic axioms. Granted,
there are other possible preferences for the global state, other than a preference
for maximising the Born-weighted sum of in-branch utilities. (Granted, too,
perhaps, that this is an important difference, in principle, from the classical
case.) But doesn’t the intuitive appeal of the axioms still provide a sense in
which such a preference would be unreasonable?
There are two ways to counter this objection, a direct way and an indirect
way. The direct way is to give examples of ways in which intuitively reasonable
global preferences can conflict directly with some of the axioms in question.
Again, the analogy with classical problems of distributive justice is likely to
prove helpful. Suppose I have a choice of leaving $1000 to each of my seven
children, or $1100 to six of them and $1000 to the last. The latter choice
dominates the former, in that no child is worse off and some are better off.
But is it a better choice? Many of us would say that it is worse, because it is
unjust.11
The indirect way to counter the objection is to point out that the appeal
to the axioms makes assumptions about an agent’s utility function that simply
beg the question against the possibility of agents of the kind relevant here:
agents who have preferences (of a non-MEU form) about the global state. As
I’ve explained, the Oxford approach amounts to trying to mandate a particular
global preference as a principle of rationality. What’s wrong with an attempt to
appeal to the axioms to rule irrational an alternative global preference is that
the axioms make assumptions about utilities, about what an agent cares about,
that are simply inapplicable to the kind of agent my objection has in mind – an
agent for whom the payoff lies in an Everettian version of distributive justice,
for example.
11For some different axiom-busting considerations, see Lewis 2005, §4.
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7.1.2 A difference between Everett and distributive justice?
Figure 1: Greaves on Everett and Distributive Justice
In a panel discussion at the Many Worlds@50 meeting, Greaves (2007c) sug-
gested a way of drawing a distinction between Everettian decisions and those
faced in classical problems of distributive justice. Her idea (see Fig. 1) is that
there are two dimensions on which we may compare and contrast the Everettian
situation to one-branch decision under uncertainty, on one side, and cases of
distributive justice on the other. One dimension – the one emphasised in my
objections – tracks the number of individuals involved. In this dimension, we
have one recipient in cases of classical uncertainty, and many recipients both in
Everett and in cases of distributive justice. The other dimension – the one that
Greaves recommends that we should emphasise instead – tracks the issue as to
whether all the individuals involved are ‘me’ (i.e., the agent). Greaves suggests
that it is the fact that all the beneficiaries are ‘me’ that unifies classical uncer-
tainty and Everett; and the fact that not all are ‘me’ that makes distributive
justice different (so that MEU doesn’t apply, in those cases).
As I’ve set things up above, however, we’ve already taken the ‘me’ out of
the picture, for other reasons. (The basic reason was that only ‘me’ relevant
to classical subjective decision theory is the ‘me at the time of choice’.) So it
simply isn’t available to do the work that Greaves wants it to do, in the present
context.12
12Could we replace it, for Greaves’ purposes, with my notion of ‘locus of concern’? No, for
it simply isn’t true, of classical distributive justice problems, that there is only one person in
the group whose welfare is ‘really’ my concern. (Recall the case of arranging one’s affairs to
benefit a group of children.)
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7.1.3 What about weight?
Finally, it might be objected that the distributive justice challenge simply ig-
nores the branch weights – the crucial disanalogy between the Everett case and
classical problems of distributive justice is precisely that in the former case, it
is not true that all ‘concernees’ are created equal, at least from the decision-
maker’s perspective. After all, that’s what weight is, on Greaves’ view: a mea-
sure of rational degree of care. Don’t we simply beg the question against the
view, if we insist on the analogy with classical distributive justice?
This brings us to a crucial issue. What kind of consideration could it be, in
the Everett picture, that would make it rational to give more consideration to
some of our loci of concern than others, in the way proposed. I’ll approach this
issue by considering the analogous question in the classical context.
8 Why should weight matter?
8.1 The Credence-Existence Link
Consider the initial version of Legless at Bondi (only my leg is cloned). Suppose
I survive the operation, as planned, with two good legs. Why don’t I care
about the unfortunate ‘possible me’, whom the operation left with no legs at
all? Because, happily, he doesn’t exist. (I have no duty of care to a Man Who
Never Was.)
Why didn’t I care about him (much) before the operation, when I wasn’t
certain that he didn’t exist? Because I was very confident, even then, that
he wouldn’t exist. And in the limit, being very confident equates simply to
believing. At least to a first approximation, then, we can say that I ignored
him because I believed – rightly, as it turned out – that he didn’t exist.13 In
the classical case, then, the justification for giving preference to higher weighted
alternatives goes something like this. We give (absolute) preference to actual
things over ‘merely possible’ versions of the same things, and the weights simply
reflect our degrees of confidence about which things are actual. (Call this the
Credence-Existence Link.)14
This doesn’t work in the Everett case: if well-weighted pleasure comes at
the expense of low-weighted pain, then it is real pain, despite its weight. What
Greaves needs is a measure which has the same normative implications as ‘con-
fidence in non-existence’, while being entirely compatible with ‘certainty of ex-
istence’.15 That’s what an analogue of classical uncertainty would look like.
13And note that if my belief had proved false, I might be culpable for that, but not for what
I did in the light of it – given what I believed, I was right to ignore him.
14True, there are some subtleties about the notion of belief as a limit of credence. One way
to unpack the idea a little further, sticking closely to the pragmatic understanding of credence,
goes something like this. In practice, any assignment of degrees of belief has a resolution limit
– an ‘epistemic grain’, beneath which differences are of no practical significance. At this limit,
low probability equates to zero, for the purposes at hand. I act just as if I believe that the
low-weight alternatives don’t exist.
15Greaves proposes that existence might come by degrees, though reality doesn’t:
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8.2 What alternative is there?
Greaves suggests that there is no realistic alternative to a caring measure based
on the Born weights. But we need to distinguish two questions. First, is there
any rival MEU approach – i.e., any rival to the Born measure, if Everettian
decision theory is agreed to an analogue of classical decision under uncertainty?
And second, is there any rival to the MEU approach itself? We need to answer
the second question, before we can take refuge in a negative answer to the first.
We’ve seen that there do seem to be non-MEU alternatives, modelled in part
on problems of distributive justice. It is no answer to this challenge, obviously,
to claim that there are no alternatives within the MEU framework. Moreover,
Greaves herself notes another possible positive answer to the second question,
viz., the nihilist option, that rational action is simply incoherent in the Everett
world:
[I]t could turn out that there were no coherent strategy for rational
action in an Everettian context. . . . As Deutsch notes, this possibil-
ity cannot be ruled out of court:
It is not self-evident . . . that rationality is possible at all, in the
presence of quantum-mechanical processes—or, for that mat-
ter, in the presence of electromagnetic or any other processes.
(Deutsch, 1999, p. 3130) (Greaves 2004, 432)
The ‘what alternative is there?’ plea can hardly have much force, presumably,
while nihilism waits in the wings (drawing strength from the difficulties that
the DW approach has in explaining why weight should have normative signifi-
cance).16
Greaves notes that the most commonly suggested rival to the Born measure
is what she calls Egalitarianism, or Naive Counting: a view that tries to treat
all branches equally. Following Wallace, however, Greaves (2007b, 120) claims
that this view turns out to be incoherent, in a decoherence-based version of the
Everett picture, because the number of branches is not well defined:
Lockwood’s . . . talk of a ‘superpositional dimension’, and/or Vaidman’s . . . sug-
gestion that we speak of the amplitude-squared measure as a ‘measure of exis-
tence’, are somewhat appropriate (although we are not to regard lower-weight
successors as less real, for being real is an all-or-nothing affair – we should say
instead that there is less of them).’ (Greaves 2004, 30)
For my part, I can’t see how such a distinction could make a difference here. Why should
my concern for another’s welfare depend on whether he exists (and hence on the degree to
which he exists, on this view), but not simply on whether he is real? And in any case, the
kind of ‘Do no deliberate harm’ principles which weight needs rationally to trump, to meet
the objections above, are insensitive to quantity in the sense of frequency. What could make
them sensitive to quantity in the sense of degree of existence?
16In the light of §5.1, nihilism can only be view that there is no preferred rational strategy.
As we saw, suitable preferences about the global state can certainly determine a rational
strategy (without uncertainty). So nihilism needs to be understood as the view that there is
no rational constraint on global preferences themselves.
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Why does naive counting break down in the decoherence approach?
The core of the problem is that naive counting . . . presupposes the
existence of a piece of structure that is not in fact present in the
theory.
However, I think that Greaves and others have failed to distinguish two versions
of Egalitarianism, only one of which is aptly called Naive Counting (and subject
to this objection).17 The version Greaves has in mind is a view that accepts
that rational decision in the Everett world should properly be an analogue of
classical decision under uncertainty, but simply proposes a rival measure – a
measure that in the finite case in which there are N branches, gives each branch
a weight of 1/N . Grant that this turns out to be incoherent, for the reason
Greaves describes.
The rival form of Egalitarianism (‘Outcome Egalitarianism’) simply rejects
the attempt to make numerical comparisons, treating all non-null outcomes as
having the same kind of claim to be taken into account. Thus it rejects the idea
that there is any sort of comparative weight to be associated with outcomes, with
normative significance, whether counting-based or not. Is this view incoherent?
If so, it doesn’t seem to be because the number of branches is ill-defined in a
decoherence-based version of the Everett interpretation – this view embraces
that lesson.
9 Conclusion
Some brief conclusions. The ‘Why does weight matter?’ challenge has not been
met. It is far from clear that there aren’t compelling alternatives, or at least
supplements, to a Deutschian decision policy, for an agent who believes that
she lives in an Everett world. (Some of these alternatives are motivated by
considerations analogous to those of distributive justice, but perhaps not all – if
quantum Russian roulette appeals, it is for other reasons.) It is true that these
considerations fall a long way short of a unified Everettian decision policy, and
in particular, do little to stave off the larger threat of nihilism. But without a
explanation as to why weight should have normative significance, Deutschian
decision theory does no better in this respect. Most importantly, there seems
little prospect that a Deutschian decision rule can be a constraint of rationality,
in a manner analogous to the classical case. The fundamental problem rests
squarely on the distinctive ontology of the Everett view: on the fact that it
reifies what the one-branch model treats as mere possibilia, and hence moves
its own decision rule into the realm of ‘mere preference’. I conclude that the
problem of uncertainty has not been solved.18
17Cf. Lewis’s (2005, 14–15) distinction between the Average Rule and the Sum Rule.
18It is worth noting that this whole issue takes for granted that free choice makes sense in
the Everett world, as much as it does in the one-world case. But there are reasons to doubt
that, too. Whenever I form an intention to φ, there’s a small ‘probability’ that my intention
will be thwarted. Hence in an Everett world, I know that my ‘decision’ to φ produces some
descendants who φ and some descendants who don’t φ. What sense, then – at least in advance
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